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Introduction 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, and in other writing (Walvin 2007; Quirk 2009), slavery has 
been a feature of virtually all major civilisations in history and children have been 
caught up in traditional forms of slavery across different cultures.  Indeed, children 
have often been ‘born into’ slavery, i.e. regarded as the possession of a slave-owner 
from birth.  Equally, practices of selling children into slavery for economic reasons 
have been ubiquitous over time and across different countries and cultures.   The 
phenomenon of ‘child slavery’ has been persistent, even after the formal international 
legal abolition of slavery in the nineteenth-century in most parts of the world.  
‘Modern’ forms of child slavery may include, for example, severe forms of child 
labour, child trafficking and child sexual ‘exploitation’,(see Ch. 6) or a combination 
of these.   
 
A rational approach to the construction of international legal regimes will need to take 
stock of the nature and extent of such practices in the real world.  However, despite 
the best efforts of international organisations such as UNICEF and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), the covert character of such practices does not make for 
easy or reliable empirical evidence to be gathered to measure the extent of child 
slavery.  The nature of the problem is also difficult to define conceptually. The 
existence of modern forms of child slavery depends in part on one’s view of the 
parameters of meaning attached to our concept of child slavery.  If one takes a narrow 
view, perhaps based on the legal definition found in the Slavery Convention 1926, the 
‘problem’ of child slavery becomes associated with a concern about a smaller subset 
of occurrences of the phenomenon, so defined, around the world.  On the other hand, 
an over-liberal definition, perhaps based more on the notion of ‘exploitation’ – the 
dominant language used in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989 – 
might include such a broad range of such practices that it loses any analytical integrity 
or functionality.  
 
To some extent, the international legal framework relating to child slavery has 
struggled to provide a sensible balance between these two positions, but, as will be 
seen, globalisation has not produced a coherent, uniform system of international legal 
protection. Our changing social recognition of the phenomena of slavery, servitude, 
enslavement, forced labour or practices similar to these has given rise to a parallel 
(but not always coterminous) development of such key concepts in international legal 
instruments, which are fundamental to the construction of the international legal 
framework.  It should be noted, for the purposes of this Chapter, that the 
‘construction’ of this framework carries a dual meaning: it includes both the historic 
manner in which this framework has been built up, and the normative sense of how 
this framework ought to be built.   
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Prohibition of slavery 
 
The prohibition of slavery was finally established in the Slavery Convention 1926, 
subsequently reinforced under Article 4 of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948. Whilst the Convention’s Article 1 still provides the accepted definition 
of slavery, (see Ch. 2), the realisation that many practices may not have been 
subsumed within its definition led to the implementation of the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery 1956 which provided for the abolition of a variety of 
practices similar to slavery under Article 1. These include debt bondage, serfdom, the 
inheritance of a woman, and extreme forms of child labour. These two conventions 
were not specifically directed at the rights of the child, but recognised and prohibited 
a number of practices that applied to both adults and children. Numerous subsequent 
related treaties have served to crystallise the prohibition of slavery and enhance the 
view that it has achieved jus cogens1 status, the International Court of Justice defining 
the prohibition of slavery as an obligation ‘erga omnes arising out of human rights 
law’2, an obligation owed by a state to the international community as a whole.  
 
The progressive growth of treaties relating to slavery and servitude reflects the 
international community’s awareness of  ‘contemporary forms of slavery’ and has 
also moved over time to address the protection of women and children in particular, 
as those most vulnerable and likely to be subjected to such practices. Thus states are 
subject to an extensive range of obligations with regard to the prohibition of child 
slavery and similar practices. The provisions of the CRC and its Optional Protocols, 
ILO Convention No.182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the Protocol to the 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereafter the Palermo 
Protocol – see other Chapters, especially 3,5,6), together with international and 
domestic judicial discourse, demonstrate a concerted attempt to prohibit, in particular, 
all possible forms of child exploitation. The forms most commonly linked to slavery 
include debt bondage, child trafficking, forced marriage, sexual exploitation and the 
more extreme forms of child labour.  
 
However, as the extent of child exploitation has become more apparent, the term 
‘slavery’ has understandably been appropriated by the anti-slavery non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) community which has sought to draw attention to the problem by 
subsuming the breadth of identified practices within the meaning of slavery, thereby 
benefiting from the stigmatisation attached thereto, even though the practice may not 
genuinely amount to slavery in strict legal terms.  
 
                                                 
1 A norm accepted by the international community as being so fundamental that there can be no 
derogation from it. Accepted examples include genocide and piracy.  
2 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) 5 feb. 1971, ICJ Reports 1970: 
32. 
 3 
 
Slavery and servitude 
 
The accepted definition of slavery, drawn from Article 1 of the Slavery Convention 
1926,3 provides that slavery is ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.’4 An examination 
of the travaux préparatoires to the Slavery Convention indicates that it was not 
intended as a means to combat all forms of exploitation (Allain, 2008), and a narrow 
interpretation synonymous with chattel slavery has previously been adopted by the 
European Court of Human Rights.5 However, more recent case law6 and current 
academic discourse demonstrates this as an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation 
(Cullen 2006; Allain 2009; Nicholson forthcoming); an absolute definition may 
impact on immigration law and result in lengthy attempts to bring the particular facts 
within the confines of definition. (Cullen 2006:591-2) A concept of slavery as chattel 
slavery, i.e. legal ownership - the law does not know of any right of ownership over a 
person - also does not take into account the full wording of the definition. Taken as a 
whole to include the preceding words ‘any or all powers attaching to [the rights of 
ownership]’, the definition can instead be interpreted to encompass de facto slavery.7 
(Allain 2009:274) This interpretation is borne up by the court in R v Tang [2008]8 and 
by an analysis of the travaux préparatoires to the 1926 Convention, and is seen in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which adopts the definition of 
slavery from the 1926 Convention to define the act of enslavement, but adds ‘…and 
includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children’9, an approach that is further supported by the 
International Criminal Court on interpretation of Article 1 of the 1926 Convention in 
Kunarac (2001).10  
 
Instead, a more general concept of child slavery would have the result that forced 
domestic service, and many other practices similar to slavery, would fall under current 
legal provisions on slavery without further analysis. The social context of child 
slavery has shifted and traditional notions of absolute ownership may no longer be 
relevant. In practice, child slavery has become a generic term for a range of offences – 
child trafficking, forced marriage, sexual exploitation, and extreme forms of child 
labour. Some of these practices may in reality be subsidiary to the ‘true’ concept of 
slavery as envisaged by the drafters of the 1926 Convention, but many will fall within 
the meaning of servitude, and little justification can be made out for a distinction 
                                                 
3 Amended in 1953 by the Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 
September 1926 (approved by General Assembly Resolution 794 (VIII)) 
4 Article 1(1) the Slavery Convention 1926. Article 1 (2) provides “The slave trade includes all acts 
involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all 
acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal 
by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every 
act of trade or transport in slaves.” 
5 Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16. 
6 See R v Tang [2008] HCA 39 
7 slavery by fact 
8 Op cit n.6 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 7(1) ‘For the purpose of this 
Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack::…(c) enslavement.’ The definition of the Slavery Convention 1926 is adopted under article 
(7)(2) but adds ‘and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children.’ 
10 See Kunarac et als. (IT-96-23-T &-IT-96-23/1-T) Judgment, 22 February 2001, at 117-118. 
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between slavery and servitude. Indeed many international and regional treaties place 
these two terms consecutively within the same provision, unlike slavery and child 
labour which are often treated separately. (Nicholson forthcoming 2010) Thus, 
slavery may instead have to be determined via one or more of the following notions: 
the capability to sell or dispose of a person; the disempowerment of the individual; the 
denial of bodily integrity; or the devaluation of the person (noting that children have 
traditionally not been granted full rights as persons). 
 
 
Slavery, Servitude and Forced Labour 
 
There nevertheless remains a significant overlap in identified practices falling within 
the meaning of servitude and forced labour. Most practices outlined in ILO 
Convention No.182 could amount to child slavery or servitude, but it is also clear that 
Article 3(d) which provides for work which is likely to harm the health, safety or 
morals of children may not reach the standard for slavery or servitude.  The sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage, serfdom and forced and compulsory labour are 
stated as forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery under Article 3(a) ILO 
Convention 182, yet the 2005 Convention on Action Punishing Trafficking in Human 
Beings provides that, inter alia11, trafficking may include slavery or servitude. Thus 
there is recognition that these practices may amount to slavery or servitude, but are 
not in themselves routinely regarded as such, perhaps instead being linked to forced 
labour or other related practices. This begs the question whether any distinction is 
necessary. However, child labour is not considered as yet to have achieved jus cogens 
status: the existence of qualifications to forced and compulsory labour under ILO 
Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 may enable a state to classify that its practices fall 
within an exception12 thereby avoiding responsibility and leaving the victim with little 
avenue for redress. The Slavery Convention itself does not prohibit forced labour 
where for public services, but under Article 5, the parties are to recognise that 
recourse to compulsory or forced labour may have grave consequences and 
undertake … to take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour 
from developing into conditions analogous to slavery. Conversely, there can be no 
such qualification to the prohibition of slavery and servitude.  
 
Further, accurate and consistent interpretation as to which offence has been carried 
out will influence the measures implemented to assist the child’s psychological and 
physical recovery, and would additionally impact on sentencing. Recognition that the 
mens rea for slavery or servitude may be distinct from that of similar practices, more 
certainly of the ‘lesser’ forms of  forced labour, will mean that the penalty will need 
to reflect the offender’s state of mind and parallel the seriousness of the harm. If a 
legal distinction does exist between slavery and servitude on the one hand, and forced 
or compulsory labour on the other, a variance in protection may therefore arise, 
further compounded by issues of cultural relativity, varying notions of childhood, and 
disparate domestic laws on the rights of the child. (See Chs. 3 and 5) 
 
                                                 
11 Amongst other things 
12 See for example the representations of Myanmar to the United Nations that children and adults are 
required to work on road construction, despite clear witness reports from Amnesty international 
indicating that its actions are a clear breach of the ILO Conventions.  
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Ultimately the problem with determining slavery as an identifiable practice or 
collection of practices distinguishable from ‘lesser’ harm may soon be rendered 
irrelevant in the light of the proliferation of legal instruments on recognised practices 
relating to child exploitation. International law has become saturated with treaties 
attempting to tackle these exploitative practices. There is evidence of a significant 
move towards protecting women and children given their weakened status in society 
and the resultant vulnerability of their position. It is perhaps time to view the slavery 
conventions as essentially inert: these are conventions that provide essential 
definitions and an understanding of the development of human rights law on slavery, 
but beyond that a precise meaning of slavery may well vanish in favour of a 
prohibition of more distinct practices, with specific and appropriate measures for 
protection and reparation, such as those relating to trafficking under the Palermo 
Protocol.  
 
 
The Inception of Child Specific Rights 
 
Whilst the 19th century abolitionist movements did not usually make distinctions 
between adults and children, the 20thcentury has seen not only a general sophistication 
of international texts on human rights protection, but also a focus on the welfare and 
rights of children specifically.  Two years prior to the first Slavery Convention, a 
(non-binding) Declaration of the Rights of the Child was adopted by the League of 
Nations in 1924, prompted by armed conflict in the Balkans.  This brief five-point 
document had first been promulgated by the non-governmental ‘Save the Children 
International Union’ led by the British campaigner, Eglantyne Jebb (1876-1928).  It 
was in fact the first declaration of human rights adopted by an inter-governmental 
organisation and preceded the (strictly speaking, non-binding) United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 194813 by a generation. The Declaration was 
a product of international concern, in the wake of the First World War, of children’s 
particular vulnerability in times of armed conflicts and famines.  As one commentator 
puts it, ‘the devastation of the war gave new credence to the child in distress as the 
symbol of the problems of social life’. (Marshall 1999: 145) Then came the expansion 
of this text into a ten-point Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 promulgated 
by the UN’s General Assembly.  ‘The essential theme underlying all of these non-
binding declarations was that children need special protection and priority care’. 
(Cantwell 1992: 19)  Although it was not technically binding in international law, ‘its 
unanimous adoption by the General Assembly gave it a significant moral authority’ 
(Buck 2005: 48) and it became the text on which the first drafts of the (binding) CRC 
1989 was based thirty years later. 
  
The origins and development of the UN’s CRC is a significant and revealing story in 
its own right. (see Hammarberg 1990; Cantwell 1992; Van Bueren 1995) However, 
for our purposes, five of its general features can be noted.  First, it contained, for the 
first time in international law, an attempt to produce a comprehensive and coherent 
account of children’s rights, both ‘first generation’ civil and political, and ‘second 
generation’ social, economic and cultural rights.  Although the language deployed has 
                                                 
13 The UN Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 4, states that: ‘No one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’  A near identical 
prohibition of slavery and the slave trade was contained in the (binding) International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 8(1). 
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changed – the words ‘slavery’ and ‘servitude’ do not appear at all in the text of the 
CRC – it includes a number of provisions aimed at addressing exploitative behaviours 
and practices in respect of children that are at analogous to older legal concepts found 
in the 1926 and 1956 Slavery Conventions.14  Secondly, the CRC reflects a 
construction of the child as a more active and distinct right-holder, in contrast to the 
image of children as passive objects of concern in need of special protection and care 
contained in older Declarations.  Thirdly, spurred on by the UN’s ‘International Year 
of the Child’ in 1979, the working group developing the text of the CRC met over a 
lengthy period and was remarkable for the high level of NGO participation (Cohen 
1990; Cantwell 1992) in its work. NGOs’ participation has been reflected in the 
reporting process of the Convention machinery; NGOs may be consulted and 
contribute to the examination of a Member State’s official periodic reports.15  
Fourthly, this reporting process to a ‘Committee on the Rights of the Child’ 
established under the CRC remains the only process whereby Member States can be 
sanctioned for practices departing from CRC standards; there is otherwise no court 
forum.  
   
Finally, the CRC is famously the international instrument with the most number of 
ratifications amongst the whole body of international treaties.  The only states not to 
have ratified are Somalia and the United States.   Somalia’s non-ratification is largely 
due to its failure to maintain regular government infrastructures familiar in the 
international community.  There has been an expanding literature to explain the 
United States’ failure to ratify which had an active interest and participation in the 
early drafting of the Convention. (Cohen and Davidson (eds.). 1990; Kilbourne 1998; 
Todres et al. (eds.). 2006)  In the past there has been a strong suspicion in the United 
States that ‘children’s rights’ were in competition with ‘parents’ rights’ and that the 
Convention in certain respects threatened the privatised realm of parent/child 
relationships.  This concern is reflected structurally to the extent that family and child 
law is generally left as a matter for state legislatures rather than federal institutions. 
Consequently there are concerns that ratification would inappropriately federalise an 
area of activity traditionally associated with state competences.  The absolute 
prohibition on capital punishment or life imprisonment without possibility of release 
(CRC Article 37) sat uneasily with a country where several states had permitted 
capital punishment of under 18-year-olds in certain circumstances.  However, a 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 2005 held, by a 5-4 majority, 
that it was unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while 
under the age of 18.16 That decision overruled a previous ruling17 upholding capital 
punishment for persons at or over the age of 16.  In any event, such objections, based 
on the US Constitution, are not insuperable.  Where there are potential conflicts, the 
United States could always ratify with appropriate ‘reservations, understandings and 
declarations’.18  It is also the case that no treaty can override the US Constitution.19  In 
any event, it is arguable that the CRC is not a ‘self-executing’ treaty, i.e. it would 
need state legislation to progress the implementation of the CRC. The CRC contains 
                                                 
14 For example, protection from economic exploitation (Article 32), illicit production and trafficking of 
drugs (article 33), sexual exploitation (Article 34), trafficking (Article 35), ‘all other forms of 
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare’ (Article 36), and children’s involvement in 
armed conflict (Article 38). 
15 CRC Article 45(a). 
16 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
17 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
18 See CRC, article 51. 
19 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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little by way of direction as to how to implement the various rights, so the perceived 
threat to US state sovereignty is without rational foundation.  At the time of writing, it 
would appear that, prompted by a vigorous campaign to do so, the Obama 
administration might yet achieve US ratification of the CRC.20 
 
The central importance of the CRC in providing a near-global normative legal 
standard, customised specifically to children, has been further strengthened by the 
addition of two Optional Protocols to the CRC machinery in 2000: the Optional 
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (OPSC)21 
and the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
(OPAC)22. Interestingly, the United States has ratified both of these Optional 
Protocols.  OPSC has two overall aims: to strengthen international criminalisation; 
and, to provide welfare protection for child victims. It is arguably the case that while 
the Protocol may have assisted in the process of international criminalisation, its 
implementation appears to have had a weaker impact on the protection of child 
victims. (Buck 2008:176) Article 38 of the CRC had reiterated states’ international 
duties to respect humanitarian law in armed conflicts relevant to children and to take 
‘all feasible measures’ to ensure that persons under the age of fifteen do not 
participate directly in hostilities and to refrain from recruiting under 15-year-olds into 
their armed forces. The CRC also contains a duty on states to take ‘all appropriate 
measures’ to the recovery and social reintegration of children who have been victims 
of a range of exploitative behaviour including armed conflicts.23  OPAC builds upon 
these provisions, highly controversial during the drafting of the CRC, and further 
details the standards against the use of children in armed conflict, in addition raising 
the minimum age of participation to 18 years. 
 
Indeed, the gathering authority of the CRC on matters of international child law has 
prompted commentators to argue that it can be regarded as having entered into the 
body of international customary law; and that the parts of the CRC that, in effect, 
prohibit child slavery or practices analogous to slavery, can be regarded as jus 
cogens24 and cannot be derogated from, even by countries that have not ratified it. 
(Van Bueren 1994:53-57)  
 
 
Child Labour 
 
                                                 
20 See The Campaign to For US Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, website at 
http://childrightscampaign.org/crcindex.php  
21 Entered into force in international law on 18 January 2002. 
22 Entered into force in international law on 12 February 2002 (‘Red Hand Day’). 
23 ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery 
and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any 
other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such 
recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect 
and dignity of the child.’ CRC Article 39. 
24 See n.1. Article 53 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty will be void ‘if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.’  This rule, 
known as jus cogens ‘will also apply in the context of customary rules so that no derogation would be 
permitted to such norms by way of local or special custom.’ Such peremptory norms probably include: 
the unlawful use of force; genocide; slave trading; and piracy. (Shaw 2003:117) ‘If the prohibition on 
slavery amounts to jus cogens, the argument that the institutions and practices similar to slavery also 
amount to jus cogens, becomes very compelling.’ (Van Bueren 1994:56) 
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Certain ILO Conventions25 complement the CRC and its Optional Protocols with a 
developed international regulation of exploitative child labour.  Smolin (2008) 
indicated that there have been four distinct stages of development associated with the 
history of international legal protection against exploitative child labour.  First, five 
specific areas of work were identified for minimum age in employment regulation 
between 1919 and 1932.26 Secondly, progress was made to raise the minimum age 
from 14 to 15 years via a number of conventions.27 Thirdly, there followed a 
consolidation of these efforts in the form of the Minimum Age Convention 1973 
(C138). Fourthly, and most recently, the overall tendency has been for the 
international community to make efforts to mainstream child labour issues within 
ILO; a process that eventually led to the current ‘market leader’ international 
instrument in this field, the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 1999 (C182) (see esp. Ch. 4).   In particular, the concept of the ‘worst 
forms of child labour’ comprises four categories including one which, in effect, 
assumes that the form of work is intolerable because of the work relationships 
involved:  
...all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory 
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed 
conflict. (Article 3(a)). 
A second and third category assumes the nature of the work itself is intolerable, for 
example, child prostitution, and child pornography and using, procuring or offering a 
child for illicit activities, in particular the production and trafficking of drugs (Articles 
3(b) and (c)).  A fourth, residual category refers to ‘work which, by its nature or the 
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals 
of children’ (Article 3(d)).  No doubt reflecting the difficulties of achieving 
international consensus in this area, the definition of what type of work might belong 
to this residual category is left to national governments to consider after consulting 
with the guidance on ‘hazardous work’ contained in the (non-binding) Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Recommendation 1999 (R190).   
 
The 1999 Convention has provided a model of child protection that arguably reveals a 
more widespread impetus within the international community to frame international 
instruments that strike a sensible balance between universalism and cultural relativity.  
Whilst the CRC can be described as a paradigm of global standard-setting, a focus on 
child labour inevitably draws in very difficult issues of cultural relativity.  The 
diversity of children’s lives across different cultures and located within differing 
economic and social conditions does not necessarily lead to single, universal answers 
to the difficult questions, such as how do we identify when children’s work becomes 
                                                 
25 Forced Labour Convention 1930 (C29); Minimum Age Convention 1973 (C138); the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention 1999 (C182). 
26 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919 (C5); Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (C7); 
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (C7); Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention (C10); Minimum 
Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 1921 (C15); and Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) 
Convention, 1932 (C33). 
27 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 (C58); Minimum Age (Industry) Convention 
(Revised), 1937 (C59); Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), 1937 
(C60); Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention, 1959 (C112); and Minimum Age (Underground Work) 
Convention, 1965 (C123). 
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‘exploitative’. This is of course especially evident in some developing countries 
where children’s work to support the family household unit and its economic survival 
generates rather different normative values than found elsewhere in the world.  The 
1999 Convention in essence represents an agreement about priorities rather than 
following the absolutist solution of a policy of outright banning of the employment of 
children represented by the various Minimum Age conventions.  There is a significant 
scholarly literature around the conflict between universalism and cultural relativity 
(e.g. Donnelly, 1984; Renteln, 1990) and many commentators have concluded both 
that ‘human rights practice essentially has to learn to operate in the middle ground’ 
(White, 1999:136) and one must find ‘approaches which involve neither the embrace 
of an artificial and sterile universalism nor the acceptance of an ultimately self-
defeating cultural relativism’. (Alston 1994:2) 
 
 
Child Trafficking 
 
The international community has also seen considerable movement in attempts to 
tackle trafficking in human beings; globalisation and increasing demand for cheap 
labour and for prostitution means child trafficking is a highly profitable economic 
crime often concomitant with gender discrimination. (Ch. 5) In this context, it is the 
human rights of the child at issue; however the trafficking of children will also impact 
on economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
Child trafficking is not limited to sexual exploitation, but it is concerned with such 
practices. The sexual exploitation of children is already addressed in CRC Article 34 
and in Articles 2 and 3 of its Optional Protocol on The Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography. These have since been enhanced by the 
Convention on Action Punishing Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 and the Palermo 
Protocol. The latter Convention and Palermo Protocol were extraordinary in that they 
were implemented as a means of tackling transnational organised crime, and not 
principally as human rights instruments. However, as a proportion of transnational 
organised crime is premised on trafficking and sexual exploitation, the human rights 
provisions are a fortunate and necessary by-product.  
 
The Palermo Protocol has become particularly important in this regard, clarifying and 
extending the meaning of trafficking and in particular dealing with the important issue 
of consent (as irrelevant)28 and providing for distinct measures to be implemented to 
assist the victim (Article 6). The accepted meaning of trafficking is now significantly 
wider and is contained within Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol (see Chs. 2 and 6). 
Human trafficking is expressed as comprising three elements: the operation 
(recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons), means 
(abduction, fraud, deception etc.), and purpose (exploitation). In order for an adult to 
be recognised as a victim of trafficking therefore, one or more of the criteria for each 
of these elements must be fulfilled. However, a distinction arises where children are 
concerned: Subparagraph (c) provides ‘The recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered 
“trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article.’ This recognition of the particular vulnerability of a 
                                                 
28 See Article 3(b) 
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child and the incapacity of a child to give informed consent means that a child will be 
considered a victim of trafficking so long as the act (e.g. transportation) and the 
consequence (exploitation) can be shown. There is no need to prove how the child 
was placed in an exploitative position, the fact that he or she has been recruited for the 
purpose of exploitation is sufficient (from which it can be inferred that exploitation 
does not have to occur for the trafficker to have committed the crime, although there 
are likely to be evidential issues for the proof of victim status). The definition is 
therefore so wide that it is most likely already somewhat supported by existing 
domestic law on prostitution, and child labour.  
 
A common error is to perceive of trafficking as a practice that requires border-
crossing and which relates solely to sexual exploitation. Neither is correct. It is clear 
that the definition makes no such requirement. Trafficking can therefore occur within 
a state if the above criteria are fulfilled. A distinction can therefore be made between 
the treaties concerning migration29 and those that concern trafficking. Migration 
involves the voluntary movement of persons across borders, and not the coercion or 
deception of an individual for the purpose of exploitation.  
 
The explicit mention of prostitution was purposefully included to recognise the 
additional harm that occurs here. Not only is the child subjected to trafficking by the 
trafficker, but suffers the additional and particularly grave harm of forced sexual 
abuse by the user. (Huda 2006) An examination of the discussions on the draft 
Protocol indicates that the word prostitution was very carefully selected (in place of 
‘sex work’) so as to avoid interpretative debate and in order to emphasise the 
particular vulnerability of children, girls in particular. The terms ‘exploitation of 
others’ and ‘other forms of sexual exploitation’ were also carefully chosen so as to 
enable states to determine the legality of prostitution within their domestic laws. 
However, state policy on prostitution is irrelevant where children are concerned. Any 
sexual practice to which a child is subjected will not be viewed as legal. However 
sexual exploitation is not the only criteria.  
 
There is an absence of global consensus on the meaning of exploitation, but children 
subjected to the practices outlined in the Protocol (for example prostitution and forced 
labour) would automatically fall within protective legal provisions by virtue of their 
status as children; there can be no argument of true autonomy, understanding or 
consent. However, the focus of the Protocol and its related Convention is on the 
buyers causing demand and the traffickers themselves, which, it has been argued, 
diverts attention from the wider economic, social and political context of the sex 
industry – i.e the role of residency, employment and migration policy. (Anderson and 
Andrijasevic 2008: 140) 
 
Nevertheless, the trafficking provisions are an example of the development of the law 
in the field of children’s rights. The recent and more overt recognition of the 
vulnerability of the child, in particular gendered children, is reflected in a new 
emphasis on special measures for the protection and support of victims. Article 6 of 
the Palermo Protocol provides quite prescriptive measures in an effort to secure the 
physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking. This includes the 
provision of appropriate housing, counselling, psychological and material assistance, 
                                                 
29 Need to put in the protocols here 
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employment, education, training opportunities, and compensation. Under Article 7, 
states should also consider adopting measures to enable the reintegration and 
resettlement (re-patriation) of victims. This potentially indicates a new era of human 
rights obligations, moving from the formalisation of overarching values and generic 
rights, to the establishment of more precise obligations. This has important 
implications for the state which is likely to be concerned to protect its sovereignty. It 
may also prove harder to see such specific measures consistently observed in 
domestic laws in the light of cultural and legal divergences. 
 
 
Implementation and Enforcement 
 
As we have seen, the construction of the international legal framework to address 
modern forms of child slavery has been challenging both in terms of the conceptual 
and legal definitional difficulties. These difficulties are further compounded by the 
complexities of implementation and enforcement of such international instruments at 
global, regional and national levels of operation.  Both the CRC and the ILO 
conventions, for example, lack the clear lines of a discrete court enforcement 
mechanism where distinct legal remedies may be available to a state and/or individual 
litigant.  The sanctions for breach of the conventions discussed here are rather to be 
found in their reporting mechanisms. (see Ch. 2) The way in which the performance 
of individual states is exposed to political and diplomatic scrutiny and negotiation 
within nation states and on the international stage, in the United Nations institutions 
and elsewhere, should be appreciated, but equally not overestimated.  The ‘naming 
and shaming’ function of international law remains an important prompt to states to 
comply with international law.  Unfortunately, although some of the international 
instruments discussed here have obtained a very good record of ratifications by 
countries,30 this in itself is unlikely to guarantee compliance.  Hathaway’s ‘integrated 
theory’ of international law predicts, perhaps counter-intuitively, that countries with 
very poor human rights records can be as likely or even more likely to ratify treaties 
as countries with better records, but that unlike those with better records, they are 
unlikely to comply with those commitments - which are in fact the patterns found. 
(Hathaway 2005) 
 
However, any assessment of the effectiveness of these instruments should be prefaced 
by a proper consideration of the criteria by which such evaluation is made.  This is not 
only problematic because, as we have seen, the covert nature of modern forms of 
slavery make it difficult to establish a reliable empirical research base for appropriate 
action, but it is contestable as to what time periods to use for any such evaluation.  
The CRC, for example, has some very long-term programmatic goals to raise general 
standards of children’s rights, but wide areas of discretion are necessarily left to states 
to deliver such improvements.  The expectation of short, or even medium-term gains 
may inevitably lead to a negative verdict about their effectiveness.   
 
                                                 
30 State Ratifications as at September 2009: CRC, 193 parties; ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour, 171; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 164 parties; ILO Minimum Age, 154 parties; 
OPSC, 132 ; OPAC, 130 parties; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 133 parties. 
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The treaties discussed above do not all provide for an absolute prohibition; ILO 
Convention No.29 requires states merely to ‘suppress the use of forced or compulsory 
labour within the shortest possible time’ (Article 1(1)). The Palermo Protocol merely 
requests that states ensure to the extent possible implementing the measures provided 
under Article 6 to assist the victim, and to consider introducing those in Article 7.  
 
Ultimately the method of complying with obligations will continue to be subject to 
interpretation based on the existing social, economic and cultural concerns of the 
state. Perceptions that the law in place to protect children is ineffective emerge due to 
the impossibility of accurate monitoring of these practices, legal ambiguity, a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, and lack of global consensus as to the notion of childhood 
and related ethics of child labour. However, the value of the law is as a means of 
setting global standards and driving reform by the formal identification of universal 
human rights; states are encouraged to acknowledge normative values and human 
rights principles and so reflect them in domestic law. There has been widespread 
ratification of treaties protecting the child, the verbatim adoption of definitions and 
the implementation of suggested support measures in domestic legislation.  
 
The new approach to obligations evident in the more recent treaties reveals that 
international law has much to contribute to the debate about the protection of children 
subject to exploitation. International law continues to develop beyond the basic 
recognition of rights, and to streamline the human rights of the child, endeavouring to 
construct a collective and transparent schema for the protection and rehabilitation of 
children.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The widespread ratification of the treaties discussed here indicate there is now an 
extensive legal structure in place to address the problem of child slavery and child 
exploitation, evidenced by the increased promulgation of related domestic legislation. 
Given the varying jurisdictions, signature, ratification and adoption (and 
interpretation) of international and regional legal instruments, consistency of 
definition may become more important in the future; any ambiguity is likely to extend 
to states’ internal organs, with the result that domestic law may become less 
effectual.31 In particular it is clear that there is considerable variance on the meaning 
of child exploitation, complicated by issues of cultural relativity. 
 
Nevertheless, the movement from generic rights to the creation of treaties concerned 
with more distinct practices, and a focus on child specific rights, has led to the 
positive construction of measures that go beyond criminalisation and are aimed at 
providing more comprehensive assistance to the victim and the recognition of 
children as active right-holders. Such measures, although only proposals and therefore 
reliant on state policy, do much to address criticisms that human rights treaties 
provide little by way of reparation other than through the medium of compensation.  
 
                                                 
31 Confusion as to the correct interpretation can already be seen in the judgment of the Court in 
Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger (2008) Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08. 27 October 
2008. 
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Whilst questions as to the effectiveness of international treaties will no doubt continue 
given the lack of enforcement mechanism, this is somewhat contraindicated by the 
growth of treaties on children’s rights, the large ratification status of existing treaties, 
and the increased promulgation of related domestic legislation. This trend is likely to 
continue. 
 
 
Author’s note: This is a post-print version and is not to be cited. 
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